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Abstract
Vehicular ad hoc networks allow vehicles to connect themselves as
networks so that cars could communicate with each other. This paper
introduces an anonymous communication scheme providing integrity pro-
tection, multi-level privacy and auditability. The scheme is based on a
certificateless ring signature proposed in this paper, which is contributed
to reduce the length of the signature and simplify the key management.
In our scheme, vehicles can compose the anonymous group without the
help of road-side infrastructure or central authority. The computation
overhead is close to a normal signature scheme, so it is efficient in most
application scenarios. We also present a small-scale implementation to
show the availability of the prototype system.
1 Introduction
Intelligent transportation system promises to change our life in the future, and
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are extremely important components
of the intelligent transportation system. VANETs allow vehicles to connect
themselves as networks in a self-organizing way so that vehicles can communicate
freely with other vehicles or roadside infrastructures. People get better driving
experience from VANETs.
There are two promising applications in vehicular communication system:
vehicular warning and vehicular announcement [9]. Both data integrity and
auditability are of great importance in these applications. To achieve the goals
of data integrity and auditability, digital signature methods can be utilized.
However, naively using these mechanisms may affect the user’s personal privacy.
Cars are usually private possessions and kept by the owner for a long time, so
one’s car is likely to become a symbol of the owner. The data generated by the
cars in VANETs, such as position information, traveling routes and even drive
habits, are really sensitive for the owners.
We consider a real deployed system may involve more problems except for
the requirements of data integrity, auditability and privacy. The first one is
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the real-time processing of the data [9][13]. Data in some application scenarios
must be processed very quickly, thus complicated cryptographic algorithms are
not appropriate; The second problem is the adjustment of anonymity in the
system. In some systems, not every user need to be anonymous, and the user
may not keep anonymous or non-anonymous all the time [24]. For example, a
police car on duty is required to make its identity public. However, when it
is tracing a criminal secretly, it must conceal its identity and be anonymous
as the cars of the public; The third one is the problem of central registration.
Consider the following scenario: a car from Shanghai comes to Beijing. This car
was registered in a different institution with cars in Beijing, so it is very easy to
distinguish the messages coming from this car from the messages from Beijing’s
cars (maybe because it was issued a different root certificate with the cars in
Beijing). This car must be re-registered in Beijing to keep anonymous, but it
takes a lot to be done. In order to minimize the incidence of re-registration, as
many cars as possible need to be registered in the same institution. However,
it is not only resulted in management difficulties, but also not conducive to
bootstrap the system [21].
Existing works cannot meet all the demands aforementioned. Pseudonym-
based schemes usually have the advantage of efficiency, and a recent proposal
of Bhavesh et al. achieved multi-level privacy by setting different lifetime of
pseudonyms [3]. However, the scheme needs support of stable and secure road-
side infrastructures. It is not only inconvenient to deploy the system but also
takes a lot of burden of communication and computation to the roadside in-
frastructures. Group signature is another common approach used to implement
vehicular anonymous communication. The drawback of group-signature-based
schemes is the computation overhead. Although later works try to reduce the
complexity of the operations [30][31], they cannot satisfy the real-time process-
ing of the vehicular warning application. Besides, limited by the features of
group signature, group-signature-based schemes cannot address the problem of
multi-level anonymity and central registration. To achieve multi-level privacy-
preservation, Xiong et al. proposed a ring-signature-based scheme in [28]. We
consider there is a serious security problem in Xiong’s scheme because it is vul-
nerable to the unauthorized participation attack. An illegal user may compute
key pairs by himself without the authentication of the Member Manager, and
the other users cannot know if the public key is coming from a legitimate user.
In this paper, we proposed an anonymous communication scheme based on
ring signature. We firstly designed a certificateless ring signature scheme based
on the generalized ring signature proposed by Ren and Harn [23]. The proposed
ring signature scheme is contributed to reduce the length of the signature and
simplify the key management since user IDs are used to compute a signature in-
stead of a long string of public keys and corresponding certificates. Secondly, we
present an anonymous vehicular communication scheme based on the proposed
ring signature scheme. A protocol is designed in our scheme to achieve distin-
guishability of origins and non-repudiation. With hierarchical key structure, the
average overhead of our scheme is close to a normal signature scheme. Finally,
we implemented a small-scale prototype system on the PC platforms. The test
results of the prototype system show the availability and the robustness of the
proposed system.
Our solution has the following advantages: (1) It is very efficient and can
satisfy the requirement of most application scenarios; (2) Our scheme provides
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multi-level privacy-preservation, so different users will have different anonymous
degrees. The anonymity of the user is adjustable, and the user can decide his
anonymity freely by dynamically setting up the ring; (3) It is decentralized.
There is no registration center, and the vehicles compose the anonymous group
in a self-organizing way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a survey
of prior works. The background of our research is given in Section 3. We then
describe our scheme in detail in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze the security
and performance of our scheme, and present a comparison between our scheme
and some of the existing works. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Many schemes have been proposed to provide data integrity and privacy protec-
tion in vehicular communication system. According to the approach employed
in the scheme, they can be classified into three types: pseudonym-based scheme,
group-signature-based scheme, and hybrid scheme.
Pseudonym-based schemes ([3],[14],[19],[22]) mainly rely on the public key
cryptography. The so-called pseudonym, is virtually a short-term certificate
which does not contain the identity information. The vehicles sign a message
with its private key, and the others verify the signature of the message with the
pseudonym. The generator of key pairs may be every single vehicle [19], or a
public CA [14]. Vehicles achieve the purpose of anonymity by constantly chang-
ing the key pairs. The issuer of pseudonyms is CA, so the CA in pseudonym-
based schemes can reveal the real identity of the user to achieve auditability.
Pseudonym-based schemes are usually simple and efficient, and can be ap-
plied in a variety of scenarios in vehicular communication system. However, the
main drawback of pseudonym-based schemes is the complicated management of
pseudonyms. In [22], the CA needs to generate a large number of key pairs and
pseudonyms, and preset them in the vehicles. The amount of key pairs must
be enough until the next vehicle maintenance. Therefore, the computation bur-
den of the CA and the memory requirement of the vehicle is very high in this
way. [14] improved the scheme of [22] by reducing the amount of certificates
and computation burden, but part of the scheme is showed to be insecure [5].
In [19], the vehicles are able to generate key pairs with the help of roadside
infrastructures. The CA issues the certificate for the public key generated by
car, but in this way, an all time online CA and a secure channel are required to
keep the system works. Recently, Bhavesh et al. proposed a roadside-unit-aided
scheme providing multiple levels of anonymity in [3]. The level of anonymity is
determined by the number of pseudonyms and the lifetime of each pseudonym.
However, the scheme needs support of stable and secure roadside infrastructures
providing security services. It is not only inconvenient to deploy the system but
also takes a lot of burden of communication and computation to the roadside
infrastructures.
Group-signature-based schemes ([6],[7],[15],[17],[30],[31]) allow every legal
user (vehicle) representing an organization (group) to sign a message. The
group signature can be verified with the group certificate so that it is unclear
that who the real signer is. The group manager is in charge of issuing the public
parameters of the group, and every single user can join the group organization
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by running the join protocol. In general group signature schemes, the group
manager is able to reveal the actual identity of the group members to achieve
auditability.
Group-signature-based schemes require more complicated cryptographic op-
erations, so the processing speed of these schemes is usually slow. The later
proposals try to reduce the computational complexity of the group signature.
[31], [7]uses a simpler algorithm and batch verification technique to process
large-scale verifications. In [30], powerful roadside units help vehicles to per-
form some complicated operations so as to improve the efficiency. However,
the requirement of real-time data processing is not satisfied, for the delay of
vehicular warning application is no more than 100 ms [13]. Proposal [8] pre-
sented a hybrid scheme based on the pseudonym and the group signature. In [8],
the group signing key is used to generate a self-signing pseudonym certificate,
and the pseudonym is used to communicate. This approach not only avoids
the frequent computation of the group signature, but also solves the problem of
pseudonym certificate generation. However, limited by the features of group sig-
nature, existing schemes cannot address the problem of anonymity adjustment
and central registration.
A derived form of group-based scheme was proposed by Xiong et al., and they
used a ring-signature-based scheme to achieve multi-level privacy-preservation
[28]. The main disadvantage of Xiong’s scheme is that the expensive operation
of pairing used in the scheme is related to the ring size. If the ring size is big,
the computation burden will be very high. Besides, there is a serious security
problem of [28]. The key pair used in the ring signature is generated by the
user himself, and then was sent to the Member Manager to verify. But an
illegal user may compute key pairs by himself without the authentication of the
Member Manager. The other users cannot know if the public key is coming
from a legitimate user.
Moreover, a common issue of existing schemes is that of distinguishability of
origin. The adversary may disguise himself as numerous vehicles. He can issue
false messages, but the receiver cannot distinguish if these messages come from
one car or many cars. For example, the adversary may pretend to be many
cars and issue a message that there is a traffic jam, so the latter cars will be
deceived to leave the road. Although proposal [6] applied the approach of one-
time anonymous authentication to address the problem, we consider that there
is still a question: in [6], the two messages can be linked if and only if they are
generated by the same user and the content of the messages are the same (for
privacy consideration and solving the problem of disguising meanwhile), but the
response of the vehicle is based on the meaning of the message. Therefore, the
adversary can slightly modify the content of the message and keep the same
semantics to deceive the threshold check.
We propose an efficient scheme that will not only achieve the objectives of
security and privacy but also solve the problems of anonymity adjustment and
central registration. The hierarchical design of master secret, self-signing cer-
tificates and pseudonym keys makes the average computation overhead of our
scheme is close to a normal digital signature scheme. We proposed a communi-
cation protocol based on ring signature so that different users will have different
anonymous degrees and the user can change his anonymity dynamically. Our
scheme is immune from the typical attacks such as unauthorized participation,
masquerade attack, Sybil attack in vehicular communication system. Central
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governmental authority does not participate in the deployment of our system,
but just be an off-line supervisor. It matches the features of distributed and
decentralized in VANETs.
3 Background
3.1 Desired Requirements
Before we have an introduction to our scheme, we firstly present the system goals
of the scheme we designed. It includes two aspects: one is the basic security
requirements in an anonymous communication system in VANETs, and the
other is the unique features of our solution which can satisfy the special demands
of some specific application scenarios.
Similar to most of the existing works [15][21][29], the security requirements
can be concluded as follows:
• Integrity: Includes data integrity and entity integrity. Data integrity
ensures that the data can be transferred without unauthorized tamper-
ing. Entity integrity ensures the message comes from a legal source, and
provides distinguishability of origin.
• Privacy: Includes anonymity and unlinkability. The adversary cannot
judge the sender of a message (anonymity), and cannot decide if any two
messages come from the same source in case of user tracking (unlinkabil-
ity).
• Auditablity: Provides revocation and non-repudiation mechanism. If
any entity is compromised, the other entities can identify the compromised
entity and reject communication (revocation). The sender of a message
cannot repudiate having sent the message to ensure accountable when an
accident occurs.
Considering the requirements of the application scenarios, we expect to make
our scheme satisfying the following features:
- Efficient: Messages can be dealt within a short time to meet the require-
ments of real-time processing.
- Anonymity adjustable: The anonymity of the user is controlled by the
user himself, and it depends on the actual situation.
- Decentralized: Users compose the anonymous group in a self-organizing
manner. There is no unified registration, and members of the group can
be changed at any time.
3.2 Adversaries
There are several possible attacks in a vehicular communication system, and we
list some typical attacks here to help us analyze the security performance of our
scheme. According to the power an adversary has, we classify the attacks in
vehicular communication applications into two different types: attacks from the
outside and attacks from the inside. Typical attacks from the outside include:
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Unauthorized participation Unauthorized users directly or masquerade as
a legitimate user to participate in the system, and affect the management
of the system.
Message modification The content or the source of the message is altered by
malicious adversaries during the transmission.
Replay attack Replay valid messages which were sent some time before. The
adversarymay avoid the authentication mechanism and bother the system,
because these messages are coming from legitimate users.
Trace attack By eavesdropping issued messages, the adversary tries to trace
an entity. It infringes on the privacy of the user to bind the sensitive
content of the messages and the identity of the user.
Attacks from the inside of the system mean that the adversary is more
powerful. The adversary can even have a legitimate private key and certificates,
but abuses the mechanism to attack the system. The masquerade attack and
the Sybil attack are typical attacks from the inside.
Masquerade attack In some systems, roadside infrastructures (such as traffic
lights) may provide convenience to some special vehicles (such as emer-
gency vehicles), and the cars on the road will also make a way to these
special vehicles voluntarily. Therefore, the adversary may masquerade as
an emergency vehicle to obtain the priorities on road.
Sybil attack The adversarymay try to spread false messages to the others, and
make the receivers believe that the messages come from different sources
and the content of messages is true [11]. Because of the privacy preserving
mechanisms, the receivers cannot distinguish the sources of the messages.
Therefore, the adversary can mislead the other cars by making use of the
contradiction between authentication and privacy.
3.3 Technical Preliminaries
The key technique we used in our scheme is the ring signature. The concept
of ring signature was firstly proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman in 2001.
It allows the actual signer to produce a signature with a group of public keys
of other users (called non-signers) and his own private key. The cardinal part
of the signature, the combining function, is to construct a ring structure for
verification, so it is called ring signature. The verifier of the signature cannot
tell who the actual signer is among the set of users in the signature so as to
conceal the real identity of the actual signer. The most predominant advantage
of the ring signature is that it can be produced in a self-organizing way. It can
be used without registration, and the members and the size of the anonymous
group can be decided by the actual signer himself. Operations of ring signature
can be modeled as two algorithms:
The generalized ring signature scheme was proposed by Ren and Harn in 2008
[23]. Different from the first ring signature scheme based on RSA, this scheme
is based on the ElGamal signature scheme. The generalized ring signature
simplifies the operation in Rivest’s scheme, and all members can share the same
domain by using the same prime modulus. Our scheme is proposed based on
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the generalized ring signature scheme, but is modified to a version supporting
elliptic curves to get higher security level with shorter signature size. Besides, we
simplify the management of public keys and shorten the length of the signature
using the technique used in identity-based encryption (IBE), which is called
Combined Public Keys. Our scheme will be presented in the next section.
The idea of IBE was proposed in [26], 1984, and the first efficient scheme was
proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [2]. In an IBE system, a meaningful
string can be used as the public key so that the user of the public key can easily
learn the owner of a public key without a PKI certificate, because the public
key itself may be the identity of its owner. The idea of IBE helps us to reduce
the burden of certificates management, but the operations of most IBE schemes
are relatively complicated. In [16], Liu et al. present a simple IBE scheme using
the technique of combined public keys. In this paper, we used the same notion
as Liu el al. to improve the ring signature scheme.
4 Proposed Scheme
4.1 Overview
Different from existing works, our scheme is a hybrid scheme based on the
generalized ring signature. There are some difficulties when applying the ring
signature scheme in a real system. The first one is the problem of public key
authentication. A basic solution in real systems is to use PKI certificates, but
it brings extra computational cost. To address this problem, we proposed the
certificateless ring signature scheme. It uses IBE techniques to turn the public
key into a meaningful string, so we can use the identity of another user as his
public key. It also helps to reduce the length of the signature, and the signer
could generate a signature without mutual communication with the other user
or the CA. The second difficulty is to provide anonymity and auditability at
the same time. The generalized ring signature scheme provides a convert al-
gorithm which allows the actual signer to convert the ring signature generated
by himself to a normal digital signature so as to achieve auditability. However,
the algorithm is proved to be incorrect because any user in the ring can claim
the ring signature is generated by him [27]. The third problem is how to pre-
vent the Sybil attack. In order to solve the second and the third problems,
we designed protocols based on the proposed ring signature scheme. We bind
the identity with the generation time and the content of the certificate with-
out leaking the real identity so as to achieve authentication and privacy at the
same time. In Section 4.2, we will introduce the certificateless ring signature
algorithm in detail. Then, in Section 4.3, we will present the Anonymous Vehic-
ular Communication System, which satisfies the privacy, distinguishability and
auditability simultaneously.
Participants in our scheme can be classified into three types: the deployers,
the supervisors, and the users. The deployers initialize the system and every user
by generating parameters and preset credentials. The key update in our system
is in the charge of the deployers during the vehicle maintenance process, which
can be easily done by re-initializing the user. The supervisors can implement
the auditability. They are able to issue key revocation list and trace vehicles
for law enforcement purposes. The user of the system may be a normal private
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car, or a special vehicle on official duties.
A basic assumption of our scheme is that a vehicle is equipped with a secu-
rity hardware module, which is a common method in vehicular communication
system for security protection. The secure hardware modules can be treated
as a black box. When giving a command, it will always give us a response
correctly according to the algorithm. These secure hardware module has the
capability to provide secure storage for private keys and perform cryptographic
operations securely. In addition, the secure hardware module offers a trusted
clock which cannot be compromised to the attacker. The credentials of the
system are also stored in the hardware module, and the pseudonyms in the
communication system will be cached so that it is not necessary to transfer the
pseudonym credentials every times.
4.2 Certificateless Ring Signature
We proposed a certificateless ring signature scheme based on the generalized
ring signature scheme using the technique of Combined Public Key. The pro-
posed ring signature scheme is contributed to reduce the length of the signature
and simplify the key management. In our scheme, User IDs are used to com-
pute a signature instead of a long string of public keys and the corresponding
certificates. The scheme includes the Setup, Key Generation, Ring Sign,
and the Ring Verify algorithms. The detailed description of the proposed ring
signature scheme is given below.
Setup Let G be an addition group consisting of points on an elliptic curve
and the order of G is q. Let P be a generator of G. Firstly, select n secret
values xi ∈ Z
∗
q(1 6 i 6 n) randomly, and compute Yi = xi · P (1 6 i 6 n) for
each xi. Secondly, select two hash function H0 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n, H1 : G →
Zq. Define X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) as the master private key vector, and define
Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn) as the master public key vector. Finally, set the system
public parameters to be (G, P, q, Y,H0, H1) and make them public.
Key Generation For every user with identity id, the private key of the user
is
did =
n∑
i=1
hixi mod q
where hi is the ith bit of H0(id), i = 1, · · · , n.
Ring Sign Suppose m is the message to be signed, and the identity of the
signer is ids. Thus, the private key of the signer is dids . When he wants to
generate a signature, the signer computes as follows:
1. Pick r − 1 valid identities. The signer picks another r − 1 valid users
with himself to form a ring of r members. The method to pick identities
will be explained in the next section, and here we concentrate on the
algorithm itself. Note that U = {id1, id2, · · · , ids, · · · , idr} is the sequence
of the identities of the ring members, and the identity of the signer is the
sth identity in the sequence.
2. Extract public key. For each idi in U , the signer computes
Eidi =
n∑
j=1
hj · Yj
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where hj is the jth bit of H0(idi). The sequence of public keys of all
the ring members is {Eid1 , Eid2 , · · · , Eids , · · · , Eidr}. The calculated public
keys can be cached so that it does not have to be recalculated every time.
3. Create forgeries. For each identity idi in U , idi 6= ids, the signer picks
aidi , bidi ∈ Z
∗
q randomly and computes forgery with the public key Eidi as
follows:
Uidi = aidi · P + bidi ·Eidi
vidi = −H1(Uidi)(bidi)
−1 mod q
midi = aidividi mod q
It can be proved that (Uidi , vidi) is a valid ElGamal signature of message
midi [12], and the tuple < midi , Uidi , vidi > is the forgery for member idi.
4. Initialize the ring equation. Pick a random value γ ∈ Z∗q for the ring
equation.
5. Solve the verification equation. Note that m is the message to be
signed. Use a hash function h which was described in [4] to construct the
ring equation as follows:
wids+1 = h(m, γ)
wids+2 = h(m,wids+1 ⊕mids+1)
...
wids−1 = wids+r−1 = h(m,wids−2 ⊕mids−2)
wids = wids+r = h(m,wids−1 ⊕mids−1)
In order to glue the ring, which is wids ⊕mids = γ. Therefore,
mids = γ ⊕ wids
6. Sign mids with signer’s private key. The actual signer generates the
ElGamal signature of his mids . To form a signature on specified value, the
signer must use his private key dids . Firstly, the signer picks l uniformly
from Zq. Then, he computes
Uids = l · P
vids = (mids − didsH1(Uids))l
−1 mod q
Finally, (Uids , vids) is a valid ElGamal signature of message mids , and
output the tuple < mids , Uids , vids > for the actual signer.
7. Output the ring signature. The signature on the message m is:
S = (x,widx ; id1, id2, · · · , idr;< mid1 , Uid1 , vid1 >,< mid2 , Uid2 , vid2 >
, · · · , < midr , Uidr , vidr >)
where x is randomly selected among 1, 2, · · · , r.
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Ring Verify Given messagem and its corresponding signature S, the verifier
can verify the validity of S as follows:
1. Extract public key. Get the public key sequence of all ring members
{Eid1 , Eid2 , · · · , Eids , · · · , Eidr} with the same method as the extracting
public key period in ring signing.
2. Verify the signature of each tuple. For each idi, i = 1, 2, · · · , r, verify
the ElGamal signature of every tuple with the public key Eidi . The verifier
checks the following equation:
midi · P = H1(Uidi) · Eidi + vidi · Uidi
If any one of the tuples < mid, Uid, vid > does not satisfy the equation,
the verifier rejects the signature S.
3. Verify the ring equation. The verifier checks that if all the midi to-
gether can form the ring equation. Using the start x and its corresponding
value widx , the verifier checks the following equation:
widx = h(m,midx+r−1 ⊕ h(m,midx+r−2
⊕h(m, · · · ⊕ h(m,midx ⊕ widx) · · ·)))
where h is the same hash function as the solving verification equation
period in ring signing. If the ring equation is satisfied, the verifier accepts
the signature S. Otherwise, reject S.
4.3 Anonymous Vehicular Communication System
We introduce the proposed Anonymous Vehicular Communication System in
this section, which is designed based on our certificateless ring signature scheme.
To simplify the explanation, we use the inter-vehicles communication as an ex-
ample, and it is similar for the situation of car-roadside-unit communication.
We suppose that the deployers of the system are the independent car manufac-
tories, and the government which does not participate in the deployment of the
system is acting as the supervisor. There are seven periods corresponding to dif-
ferent operations in the system. Operation Init is used by the manufactories to
initialize the system parameters, and operation Join is used to pre-distribute
keys and credentials to every individual vehicle released by the manufactory.
Operation Reveal is designed for the supervisor to identify the vehicle for law
enforcement purposes. The other operations, genPseudonym, genMessage,
Send, and Receive are executed by the vehicles in the system. These algo-
rithms are described in the following subsections respectively.
4.3.1 Init
This algorithm was run by each car manufactory to set the Anonymous Vehicular
Communication System up. Firstly, all manufactories discuss the security level
and the addition groupG on an elliptic curve. Then, every manufactory runs the
algorithm Setup in the proposed ring signature scheme according to the group
G respectively. Denote q as the order of group G, and P as the generator of G.
Thirdly, choose three hash functions h0, h1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G, h2 : {0, 1}
∗ → Zq. In
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implementation, they can be the same hash function. Finally, make all generated
parameters and selected functions public. After the decision of prime p, every
manufactory can issue the parameters and run the Join algorithm introduced in
the next part independently, so it is conducive to the deployment of the system.
4.3.2 Join
Once a car is produced, the manufactory uses this algorithm to initialize the
vehicle hardware module so that the car is able to join the communication
system. Every car generates a master secret f ∈ Zq at the very beginning and
saves it at the security hardware module. The master secret is unique,and it is
protected by the hardware from leaking to the others. Then, the manufactory
runs the Key Generation algorithm to compute the private key did for the car,
and preset it in the hardware module. A simple method is to use the license
plate number as the input of the Key Generation algorithm. Finally, store the
master public key vectors Y of different manufactories in the secure hardware
module.
4.3.3 genPseudonym
This algorithm is used to generate a pseudonym in the process of communication
for the car. The pseudonym virtually is a public key certificate that does not
contain the identity information, and usually has a short life cycle. Public
keys can be authenticated by the pseudonym without the leak of the identity
information. The algorithm of pseudonym generation in our system is described
as follows:
INPUT: f ;U = {id1, id2, · · · , ids, · · · , idr}; dids .
pk, sk← genKeyPair()
C ← pk|| · · · ||expiration;
H ← ⌊ currentT ime
minSpanTime
⌋
J ← h0(C);K ← h1(H)
R← f · J ;T ← f ·K
L← h2(C||R||T )
S ← Ring-sign(L,U, dids)
OUTPUT:σ ←< C,R, T, S >
In the inputs of the algorithm, f represents the master secret stored in the
secure hardware module, and dids is the private key of the user ids. U represents
the union of a series of user IDs with which the car (ids) together composes the
anonymous group. The members in U and the size of U can be decided by the
user at any time. Note that special vehicles on duties must make its identity
public, which means to set the car itself as the only user in U . We suppose there
is a buffer in which some user IDs are preset, and the IDs in U are coming from
this buffer. Every time the vehicle generates a pseudonym certificate, it will
randomly select some IDs in the buffer. During the trip, the IDs in the buffer
will be constantly updated by randomly picking some IDs in ring signatures
sent by others and saving it into the buffer.
Firstly, the car generates a transient key pair used to identify the messages.
The private key sk of the transient key pairs is stored in the hardware module to
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use, and the hardware module issues the pseudonym certificate to the public key
pk. Secondly, put the public key value, certificate expiration, etc. to construct
the content of pseudonym C. Then, compute the additional time stamp T .
currentT ime is the current system time, and minSpanT ime is the minimum
generation interval of the pseudonym certificate. Therefore, the certificates
generated at the same period will have the same value of T . Next, we bind the
C, T with the master secret of the secure hardware module. Finally, sign the
generated values with the ring signature, and output the pseudonym certificate
σ. The execution of the algorithm is finished by the secure hardware module.
4.3.4 genMessage
This algorithm is used to generate application messages. The output is msg =<
M,N >, where M is the content of the message, N is the authentication part
of the message. It is the signature of M with the generated transient private
key sk, or N = Sign(M, sk) in mathematics. The execution of the algorithm is
finished by the secure hardware module.
4.3.5 Send
Messages in our system are classified into two types: certificate messages and
application messages. The generation algorithms have been given in last two
sections. This algorithm is used to send a message. In theory, for every partici-
pant in the communication, the certificate message is only need to be computed
and send once if the transient key pair remains unchanged. However, in or-
der to enhance the robustness, we introduced the parameter k. It means the
pseudonym certificate need to be re-sent after every consecutive k application
messages in case of incorrect receiving of the pseudonym certificate. The process
of the Send can be described as follows:
INPUT: σ;M = {msg1,msg2, · · · ,msgm}; k.
for i = 1 to m
{
if i%k = 0 then
send(σ)
send(msgi)
else
send(msgi)
}
4.3.6 Receive
According to different message types, the vehicle responds distinctively. When
a car receives a message coming from other cars, this algorithm is executed to
deal with the packages.
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INPUT: σ =< C,R, T, S > or msg =< M,N >;
PseudonymBuf = {σ1, σ2, · · ·};RogueList = {f0, f1, · · ·}.
if(IsPseudonym())
{
if σ = σi for any σi in PseudonymBuf then
return ⊥
if T = Ti for any σi in PseudonymBuf then
reject
J ′ ← h0(C)
if R = fi · J
′ for any fi in RogueList then
reject
if Ring-verify(h2(C,R, T ), S) = reject then
reject
PseudonymBuf ← σ
accept
}
else if(IsMessage())
{
σi ← PseudonymBuf for the corresponding pseudonym
pki ← σi
if V erify(M,N, pki) = reject then
reject
accept
}
else
return ⊥
When the connection between two cars is established, the car usually receives
the pseudonym certificate first to verify the application messages. Firstly, if
the certificate has already been in the buffer, it omits the message. Secondly,
by checking the additional information of T , the receiver could be sure if the
certificates come from one source. If a certificate in the buffer has the same value
of T , it means these two certificates may be coming from one car, and then it
rejects the message. There may exist false alert in this approach. Because
f1 = f2 ⇒ f1 ·T = f2 ·T , but f1 ·T1 = f2 ·T2 ; f1 = f2. The possibility of false
alert is very low because of the randomness of hash functions and the master
secret. In addition, if we consider the security of the clock time in the hardware
module, then different cars will have the same value of T . When trying to make
T1 6= T2. The adversary must replay the message before. However, the replay
attack can be easily prevented by checking the expiration of certificates. Thirdly,
if the pseudonym comes from a compromised hardware module, the receiver can
find out by the comparison of the revocation list. Finally, the validity of the
certificate can be judged by the ring signature verification algorithm. After
all these checks, the legitimate pseudonym will be appended into the buffer to
verify application messages later. The ID series in S may be saved in the ID
buffer so that the receiving car could use these IDs to generate its pseudonym
later.
As for application messages, the car firstly extracts the corresponding tran-
sient public key pk from the certificates buffer. By verification algorithm,N
?
=
V erify(M,pk), the integrity of the message can be verified. Then, it will be
delivered to the application to respond.
4.3.7 Reveal
This algorithm is used to determine if the message comes from the suspected
user. It can only be executed by the supervisor at a certain time, and it imple-
ments non-repudiation. When special accident occurs, the sender of a message
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may need to be identified for law enforcement purposes. Then, the supervi-
sor has the right to use this operation of the security hardware module. For
security concerning, the security hardware module will authenticate the iden-
tity of the sender before the Reveal operation is executed. Then, the security
hardware module executes as follows: suppose the certificate to be identified
is σ =< C,R, T, S >. Firstly, the supervisor initiates the Reveal request,
and sends C to the hardware module. After receiving the content, the security
hardware module generates a certificate denoted as σ′ =< C,R′, T ′, S′ > for
C. Then, the certificate is sent back. The supervisor verifies R
?
= R′, and it
proves if the certificate to be identified is coming from the participant car. Since
R = f · h0(C),if the values of R,C are equal, the value of f must be the same.
The master secret identifies the only car. If the two certificates come from the
same car, the car verified cannot deny having sent the message.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze that how the proposed scheme prevents the typical
attacks described in Section 3.2 and satisfies the desired requirements. In our
scheme, every message is attached with a digital signature, and can be verified
with a corresponding certificate sent together with the message. This mechanism
brings the features of integrity and authentication, and prevents the participa-
tion of unauthorized users and message modification. The replay attack can be
avoided by checking the expiration of the certificate and the time information in
the application packages since the security hardware module provides us with a
secure time base.
In order to preserve the privacy of the users, these certificates in our scheme
are authorized by the technique of ring signature. The members in the ring
are randomly selected and constantly updated. The adversary can only be sure
that a certificate comes from one of the members in the ring so that achieve the
goal of anonymization. The messages in our scheme are just able to be linked
in a pseudonym period. By changing the pseudonym certificate from time to
time, it protects the user from being traced. The ring signature also contributes
to preventing the masquerade attack because of anonymity-adjustment. In our
scheme, special vehicles must make its identities public to gain roads privilege.
It means that the special vehicle is the only member of the ring. Therefore, an
adversary without a real private key of a special vehicle cannot generate a valid
ring signature for the certificate.
The situations of non-repudiation and distinguishability of origin are more
complicated. We introduce two extended parts into the pseudonym certificate
to support the function. One (R) is used to bind the content of the certificate
with the identity of the signer, and the other (T ) is used to bind the issue
time of the certificate with the identity. Note that the identity of the signer
is represented by a secret stored in the security hardware module and the two
parts of the certificate are present in the form of discrete logarithm. According
to the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, it is hard to tell xy ·P from
a random string z · P for any polynomial algorithm even if x · P and y · P are
given. Therefore, if the adversary wants to trace the user from the information
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Table 1: Comparison of the security goals.
Data Dist. Privacy Audit- Anonymity Decentra-
Integrity of origin ability Adjustment lization
TAA [6]
√ √ √ √ × ×
RSB [28]
√ × √ × √ ×
Our Scheme
√ √ √ √ √ √
included in the extended parts, he is able to solve the DDH problem. Based
on the extended part R, we could implement the Reveal algorithm as well
as the revocation check in Receive. As for the Sybil attack, it was avoided
by the check of the extended part T for the adversary abusing the algorithm
genPseudonym to generate many certificates and pretend to be a number of
identities in a very short time (a minSpanT ime period) can easily be detected
by comparing the the extended part T .
We compare our scheme with two existing schemes. One is the TAA scheme
[6] for being later and more completed, and the other is the RSB scheme which
is similar with our scheme to use ring signature to achieve multi-level privacy
[28]. The comparison result is given in Table 1. Data integrity and privacy are
achieved in all the schemes, but the scheme in [28] cannot provide the entity
integrity because it cannot prevent the Sybil attack. Auditability is also sat-
isfied in TAA and our scheme while RSB is not. The additional application
requirements of anonymity adjustment and multi-level privacy are not imple-
mented in TAA, and the requirement of decentralization is only implemented
in our scheme.
5.2 Performance Analysis
In order to show the availability and the efficiency, we implement the proposed
Anonymous Vehicular Communication System prototype based on the third-
party open source software PolarSSL version 1.3.2 [20]. The test platform is
HP Compaq 8200 Elite SFF PC platform, which is equipped with Intel Core
i5-2400 quad-core CPU, clocked at 3.10 GHz, 4 GB RAM. All the computers
are connected with 802.11 USB wireless Ethernet adapters in ad hoc mode. We
consider the computation resource is not the limitation of the VANETs, and it
is not a dream that the computing devices equipped on vehicles are as powerful
as a PC.
The most expensive operation in our scheme is the certificateless ring sig-
nature signing and verifying, and may become the bottleneck of the system.
Therefore, we test the computation time of the ring signature algorithms in
different security levels and different ring sizes to show the efficiency. It is un-
necessary to use a very high degree of anonymity (large ring size) in normal
application because the members of the anonymous group will be changed con-
stantly. Every time the vehicle updates a new pseudonym, it will associate some
other cars which can be in anywhere with the information it generated. After
some rounds updating, there will be a lots of cars related to the information, and
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Figure 1: Time consuming of ring signing and ring verifying
it is enough to hide the true identity of the real sender. A larger ring size brings
higher increment of members in anonymous group, but brings heavier computa-
tion burden. Balancing requirements of anonymity and performance, we set the
upper limit of the ring size in our test to be ten. The test results are given in
Figure 1. We can learn that the computation overheads increase linearly with
the increment of ring size. We use the curves NIST recommended, and they are
widely used in real systems [1]. Figures 1 shows us the computation overhead
is very small, which shows the high efficiency of our proposed scheme. The op-
erations of ring signature are only used to generate the pseudonym certificate,
and only use once during a pseudonym period. Thus, the time consuming will
be better from the view of the whole system.
We then compare our proposed certificateless ring signature signing and ver-
ifying with the signing algorithm and the verifying algorithm in TAA scheme.
Since the overheads of hash operation and other basic operations are very small,
we estimate the computation overheads of the algorithms only depending on
these complex operations such as scalar multiplication and pairing in elliptic
curve. Consider a r sized ring in our scheme. The signing operation needs
3r − 1 scalar multiplication operations, and the verifying operation needs 3r
scalar multiplication operations. The TAA signing needs 6 scalar multiplica-
tions and 1 pairing, and the TAA verifying needs 5 scalar multiplications and
5 pairings. In usual implementation, the computation time of pairing is more
than scalar multiplication. We test the computation time of scalar multiplica-
tion and pairing of library PBC [18] implementation on type-D curves which are
used in TAA scheme. We also test the computation time of scalar multiplication
of library PolarSSL on NIST recommended curves which is used in our scheme
at the same security level. According to our test of library PBC 0.5.14, the
computation time of scalar multiplication is 1.92ms and the computation time
of pairing is 12.93ms. The computation time of scalar multiplication on NIST
curves is 2.05ms. Comparing the results, we can learn that our scheme has sim-
ilar efficiency when the ring size is not too large. Note that the certificateless
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Table 2: Number of expensive operations in different schemes.
Signing Verifying
TAA 6M+ 1P 5M+ 5P
RSB (3r + 3)M (2r + 2)M+ (2r + 3)P
Our Scheme (3r − 1)M (3r)M
ring signature algorithm and verifying algorithm are computed only once for
each pseudonym in the certificate message, and other application messages are
signed by normal digital signature algorithm. If more application messages were
sent, our scheme would reflect the greater advantage in efficiency.
Another comparison reference is the ring-signature-based scheme in [28]
which is denoted as RSB. Similar ideas make the schemes more comparable,
because the overhead of both of our scheme and RSB are proportional to the
ring size. The signing operation needs 3r + 3 scalar multiplication operations,
and the verifying operation needs 2r scalar multiplications and 2r+ 3 pairings.
RSB uses special curves (type-A1 curves) on which group elements have a order
of a composite number. According to our tests on PBC, the computation time
of scalar multiplication on type-A1 curves is 78.3ms, and the computation time
of pairing is 152.1ms. Therefore, our scheme obviously has less computational
complexity and is more efficient. Table 2 concludes the number of the expen-
sive operations, where P denotes pairing, and M denotes scalar multiplication.
Note that although we use the same symbol represent the operation of scalar
multiplication, the computation time is different because these operations are
running on different type of curves.
The main disadvantage of our scheme is the length of the ring signature. A
ten sized ring will generate a signature about 1KB. However, the transmission
average speed of the wireless ad hoc network can achieve 740.07 Kb/s and
even more according to our test. Therefore, it will be a very little delay and
still acceptable comparing the TAA scheme at the aspect of communication
transmission.
Table 3 shows the comprehensive data of the different operations. The data
are measured under the 192-bits curves and the ring size r = 10. We set the
parameter k = 10, which means that every ten application messages are sent the
pseudonym certificate needs to be resent once. We finally calculate the average
cost of n = 100 messages according to the following formula and compare the
average cost of the three schemes:
τ =
1
n
× (n× tgM + tgP + n× tsM +
n
k
× tsP + n× tvM + tvP ),
where t means the time cost. Footnotes g, s, v represent for generating, send-
ing and verifying, and footnotes M,P represent for application Message and
Pseudonym certificate. For example, the tgP means the time cost of generating
a pseudonym certificate, and so on. The data of TAA and RSB we used in Table
3 are tested with library PBC 0.5.14 on our platform. Both PBC and PolarSSL
are widely used open source library, so the test results are persuasive.
From Table 3, we can see that the average computation cost of our scheme
is the least, because most of the messages are processed by normal signature
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Table 3: Comparison of time cost (ms) in different phases.
gen gen send send verify verify Average
Msg. Pseu. Msg. Pseu. Msg. Pseu. Cost(τ )
TAA 24.4 N/A 1.9 N/A 74.3 N/A 100.6
RSB 783 N/A 16.3 N/A 1521 N/A 2320.3
Our Scheme 2.1 52.6 <1 9.7 6.7 67.4 10.9
algorithm which is pretty fast and the ring signature is used only once. RSB is
not very efficient because it needs the curve order to be a composite number.
It takes large computation burden and size of elements when implementing the
scheme, although it is provably secure without Random Oracle model. From
the comparisons above, we can conclude that our scheme is very efficient and
can satisfy the demands of different applications.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel Anonymous Vehicular Communication
Scheme based on ring signature. In order to meet the demands of some special
application scenarios, we improved the generalized ring signature scheme with
the idea of Combined Public Keys and used the proposed certificateless ring
signature scheme in our system. Our scheme can satisfy the goals of authenti-
cation, multi-level privacy and auditability at the same time. Different from the
existing scheme based on pseudonym or group signature, vehicles in our scheme
can have different anonymity and can change its anonymity at any time. Be-
sides, all the vehicles can compose an anonymous group in a self-organizing way
without the help of a central authority. The analysis of security shows that
our scheme is able to prevent the typical attacks in vehicular communication
systems, and the efficiency of our scheme is also discussed. The computation
overhead of our scheme is close to a normal signature scheme, so it is efficient
in most application scenarios.
For future work, we intend to formally prove the security of the proposed
scheme. Since giving the formal definitions of the diverse security requirements
in VANETs is difficult, giving rigorous proofs of the proposed scheme is fac-
ing great challenges. Furthermore, some improvements for key revocation and
malicious user tracing may also be worthy of studying.
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